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ESSAY
IN CELEBRATION OF STEVEN SHIFFRIN'S THE
RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCHSTATE RELATIONS
Kent Greenawalt*
Steven Shiffrin's The Religious Left and Church-State Relations is a
truly remarkable book in many respects. I shall briefly note a few of its
striking features, including some illustrative passages, and outline a number of its central themes, before tackling what for me is its most challenging and perplexing set of theses-the relations between
constitutional and political discourse, and between religious liberals, on
the one hand, and religious conservatives and secular liberals on the
other.
We might well think of this as two books in one: a book about the
constitutional law of free exercise and non-establishment, and a book
about theories of public reason and religious discourse in our political
life. Shiffrin manages to squeeze all this into 136 pages of readable,
eloquent, illuminating text, relegating his underlying deep, comprehensive, and penetrating scholarship in a wide range of disciplines to 99
pages of footnotes. Given the smaller type of the footnotes and the absence of page breaks in that part of the book, I was somewhat tempted to
see if the footnotes actually exceeded the text, but resisted.
Here is how Shiffrin deals with an originalist theory of constitutional interpretation as it applies to the Religion Clauses:
In assessing the appropriate relationship between religion and the state, it is vital to draw upon an eclectic mix
of resources. No single source of interpretation should
be regarded as dispositive. Although original intent is
entitled to interpretive weight in some circumstances, it
should not be primary for many reasons. Among other
things, it is not clear that the original intent of the Framers was for us to follow their intent. Even if it were, the
Framers themselves did not agree upon the appropriate
*
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comments were presented at the book celebrations in honor of Steve Shiffrin held at Cornell
Law School in November of 2009.

742

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 19:741

relationship between religion and government. And furthermore, even if they had agreed, it is not clear that a
legal theory requiring us to be bound in the twenty-first
century by the will of a group of eighteenth-century
white male agrarian slaveholders would have a lot to recommend it. Moreover, our whole history of constitutional interpretation testifies that precedent is a more
important source of interpretation than original intent.'
These sentences capture succinctly what others might take articles or
books to assert.
In the last third of his book, Shiffrin focuses extensively on a theory
of public reasons, a theory associated especially with John Rawls, that, at
least with respect to fundamental issues, political doctrines, and discourse in a liberal democracy should be based on shared reasons-reasons that do not depend on religious perspectives or other
"comprehensive views."'2
Before undertaking a more detailed analysis, Shiffrin writes that, in
his view, "the doctrine of public reason with its precious conception of
respect, its inflated worries of instability, and its narrow emphasis on a
particular aspect of legitimacy is a theory at war with the needs of progressive politics."' 3 He goes on to say, "Public reason disease can be
fatal in American politics." '4 Addressing the perception of many liberals

that religious involvement in politics is almost inevitably conservative,
despite religious involvement in the antislavery and civil rights movements and many efforts to achieve economic justice, he responds that the
notion that overall, religion has been "politically counterproductive in
American life is not at all obvious. Indeed it seems to lack historical
perspective and constructive imagination for the future." 5
Writing on controversial subjects tends to be strong on conclusions
but weak on balanced appraisal, or fair-minded and indecisive. Shiffrin
is exceptionally careful to recognize and accurately summarize alternative, competing positions, while still managing to express his opinions
strongly. Early on he tells us he lacks "a pipeline to the Holy Spirit" and
may be wrong about his theology and politics, but that, fallible as his
6
beliefs may be, he "maintain[s] them with conviction."
Throughout the book, Shiffrin advances powerful arguments that
nonestablishment is beneficial to religious vitality. Many writers of like
I STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFr AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 12 (2009).
2 Id. at 101.
3 Id. at 116.
4 Id. at 126.

5 Id. at 132.
6 Id. at 6.
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mind would simply point to the health of religion in the United States
and its decline in European countries with histories of established
churches as nearly conclusive proof, but Shiffrin explores a range of possible historical explanations and stresses the difficulty of pinpointing the
precise effect of various relations of church and state at successive stages
of history.
Shiffrin approaches his subject with a rich understanding of different religious and political possibilities. His own religious convictions
have evolved from fairly traditional Roman Catholic through Protestant;
agnostic, with frequent attendance at Jewish services; secular humanist,
with participation in a Unitarian Church; to a kind of return to Roman
Catholicism as a radical Catholic or Catholic of conscience. 7 I can testify to his comprehensive sense of positions within Catholicism. At a
conference last spring when he quickly detailed six different Catholic
views about claims of conscience and asked me which I thought most
sound, I responded that his grasp of the subject was so much greater than
mine I would leave the answer to him.
Consistent with his approach to other First Amendment issues, Shiffrin opposes system builders who would choose one overarching value as
the key to interpretation and seek to have all cases decided according to
their chosen value. 8 Instead, judges should engage in a kind of pragmatic assessment in terms of multiple values, an assessment that often
does not yield a conclusive demonstration of its correctness. 9 For Shiffrin, equality is one of the values behind both free exercise and nonestablishment, but it is not the overarching value sustaining either provision.
Individual liberty and autonomy are also important for both Clauses, as is
the promotion of political community. 10 The protection of free exercise
also involves not forcing individuals to choose between conscience and
legal demand, preserving respect for law and minimizing the violence of
religious conflict, protecting associational values, and protecting the personal and social importance of religion." The Establishment Clause
helps to avoid religious divisions in politics, protects the state's autonomy to protect the public interest, protects churches from the corrupting
12
influence of the state, and promotes religion in the private sphere.
These last two features turn out to be critical for Shiffrin, allowing
him to argue persuasively that separation of church and state actually
7 See id. at ix.
8 See id. at x.
9 See id. at 3, 29.
10 See id. at 12.
11 See id.
12 See id.
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protects religion, as Roger Williams claimed long ago, and that it is by
13
not promoting religion officially that the state best promotes religion.
In resisting any explanations of the Religion Clauses in which
equality is the key to decisions, Shiffrin contends that both Clauses do
contemplate special treatment of religion, that religion may get exemptions allowed or required by free exercise that need not be available to
other forms of belief and practice, and that under the Establishment
Clause the state may not teach religious truth, even though it may assert
positions on politics, social ethics, and personal lifestyles as sound or
true. 14 Although believing that "given the pluralistic character of our
people" we would have a better Constitution without "what amounts to a
monotheistic established religion," 15 Shiffrin nonetheless concludes that
what I would call "mild" endorsements, such as the use of "under God"
in the Pledge of Allegiance and "In God We Trust" on coins, are constitutionally permissible. 16 Strongly rejecting any notion that these practices are really secular and not religious, he concludes that they accord
with the original understanding and, more importantly, with the historical
tradition of our people up to the present.
Shiffrin's acute sense of nuance is strongly reflected in two comments about "under God." Although accepting its presence in the Pledge
of Allegiance, he urges that its use in public school classrooms creates a
coercive atmosphere and should be declared unconstitutional. 17 He also
explicitly rejects the idea that the Supreme Court should declare the use
of "In God We Trust" on coinage unconstitutional because invalidation
would produce a quick constitutional amendment to overturn the decision and would undercut religious liberty overall. 18 Shiffrin rightly notes
both the difficulties of predicting untoward consequences and the dangers of the Court's being understood to decide on this basis; but I was
left wondering whether he believes a court is ever justified in reaching
decisions on this basis and being less than candid about what it is really
doing.
Among Shiffrin's most interesting treatments of specific issues is
his discussion of school vouchers. Surveying the value of public schools
in helping to build a cohesive political community out of an incredibly
diverse population, he draws the thoughtful, unfashionable conclusion
that a state should even be constitutionally allowed to mandate that high
schoolers attend public schools. 19 He recognizes that this option would
13 See id. at 36.
14 See id. at 91-93.
15 Id. at 47.
16 See id.

17 See id. at 48.
18 Id.

19 See id. at 63-81.
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be a nonstarter politically, even if his recommendation had a remote
chance of becoming constitutional law; but he builds on the value of
public education to question the Supreme Court's broad acceptance of
vouchers for religious schools. 20 Voucher programs are deeply worrisome not only because of the threat to a common sense of community,
but also because of the risk to the religions that are running schools. The
religions' integrity to declare their beliefs and to practice as they think
best will be undermined as they accept state money with conditions attached. 2 1 Yet Shiffrin does not think vouchers should always be treated
as unconstitutional. Under his multiple values approach, public school
conditions may sometimes be so bad that vouchers should be deemed
22
acceptable.
Shiffrin is clear that he is doing a normative constitutional analysis,
and that the Supreme Court is unlikely to overturn its broad acceptance
23
of vouchers in 2002 in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in the near future.
Focusing on federal constitutional law, he sees the near-term practical
import of his analysis as touching the political process; but I think it also
has obvious relevance for how courts should treat the "Blaine amendments" that many state constitutions contain. 24 The language of these
amendments is typically strict about not allowing public money to be
used for sectarian education. Shiffrin's claims could well figure in how
state courts should interpret the language of these provisions and could
provide one powerful basis for federal and state courts to reject arguments that the typical application of these provisions violates the federal
25
Free Exercise Clause.
In the first parts of the book, Shiffrin sticks to what he takes to be
the traditional and correct approach to judicial interpretation and, implicitly, to scholarship about what paths judicial interpretation should follow.
That is, he makes claims that do not depend on religious premises, although some of these claims do reflect insights that those with serious
religious convictions are particularly likely to perceive.
In the intriguing final section of his book, Shiffrin shifts to the politics of liberal democracies and the place of public reason. In brief, he
argues that assertions that citizens of liberal democracies should rely ex20 See id. at 82-94.
21 See id. at 90-91.
22 See id. at 91.
23 See 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
24 See generally Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(2003).
25 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a narrow form of exclusion
for training for the ministry). For my views on this issue, see KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION
AND THE CoNsrrrtrnloN, VOL. 2, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAImNEss 424-32 (2008).
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clusively on public reasons for their political positions are ill-conceived.2 6 Claims based substantially on religious perspectives and other
comprehensive views are entirely appropriate. 27 This means, among
other things, that because much of the protection of free exercise and of
the boundaries of interactions between state and religion will be left to
the political process, those issues are properly addressed from explicitly
religious points of view.
According to Shiffrin, the religious Left, consisting of persons
whose religious persuasions are connected to liberal political positions, is
roughly comparable in size to the religious Right, comprised of those
whose religion yields conservative political positions. 2 8 He stresses the
need for the religious Left to make clear how its sense of religion bears
on public issues and urges that secular liberals should, in some sense,
recognize the advantages of religious liberalism.
What I wish to explore is just what such recognition might, ideally,
involve, but I want first to mention two uncertainties I have about Shiffrin's position on public reason. Recognizing that complying with the
constraints of public reason is significantly a matter of reciprocity-I
won't rely on my religious or comprehensive view if you don't rely on
yours-he rightly concludes that such an aspiration is unrealistic as long
as religious conservatives find no appeal in theories of public reason and
are determined to rely on their religious perspectives. 29 I think, but am
not sure, that he also believes it would be unhealthy for people to restrict
03
themselves to public reasons even if they might be persuaded to do so.
My second uncertainty is just how far Shiffrin, who is clear that the
government itself should not rely on religious premises, thinks that political figures should refrain from explaining their actions in terms of religious convictions. 31 Senator Edward Kennedy, who was. apparently
moved significantly by his Christian outlook, would provide an apt
example.
Shiffrin carefully divides secular liberals into various categories,
recognizing distinctions among those who are hostile to religion, those
who are indifferent, those who take a cooperative attitude, and those who
have mixed views. 32 In the cooperative category, he places not only
26 See SHIEFRIN, supra note 1, at 111-19.
27 See id.

28 Shiffrin is clear that he is not classifying in terms of theological positions themselves.
He recognizes that a traditional theology might lead to a liberal politics. See id. at 1.
29 See id. at 113-14.
30 See id. at 117-18 (rejecting the idea that religion is typically a "conversation

stopper").
31 See id. at 115; see also Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NoTRE DAMF L.
REv. 1631, 1633 n.5 (1999) (mentioning a "strong and specific disagreement" with my view
that officials should stick to public reasons in their public expressions).
32 See SHWFRIN, supra note 1, at 100-01.
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John Rawls but also Leslie Griffin, a Roman Catholic who agrees in the
main with Rawls's public reasons approach. 33 One might add here President Obama, who has voiced views closely similar to those of Rawls in
certain aspects. 34 I will simplify the inquiry that follows by considering
two groups: secular liberals who think religion is foolish superstition
that, at least in modem times, has a negative effect on human life, and
secular liberals who themselves maintain religious convictions, or at least
believe such convictions may be soundly based and valuable. 35
The implications of what Shiffrin says for the second group, secular
liberals who themselves maintain religious conviction, seem fairly
straightforward. Once persuaded that the claims of public reason are illconceived, either as a theory for our political life in the foreseeable future or as a theory for any political life, they would acknowledge the
appropriate place of religious premises in political debate. These secular
liberals would cease objecting to the premises of others on the ground
that the premises are religious; they would feel free to employ their own
religious premises; and they would welcome public contestations by religious liberals of narrow-minded religious premises that produce conservative political positions. Once convinced, these secular liberals
would recognize religious liberalism as sounder than a public reasons
approach. They might then think religious premises actually provide the
best grounding for many liberal political positions. These secular liberals would comfortably welcome cooperation with religious liberals even
if they thought nonreligious reasons better supported other liberal positions in politics, and they would easily recognize the advantage religious
liberals would have when it comes to debates with religious conservatives over the effects of various state involvements with religion.
What would be a reasonable response from those liberals who think
religion is foolish superstition that detracts from human life is more complicated? They might be persuaded that a theory that political life should
be circumscribed by public reasons is unrealistic, but they would continue to think that all religious premises are badly misguided. They
might be persuaded that the religious Left has positions on church-state
relations that are "more politically attractive" than their own, but they
36
would be unlikely to concede that they are "superior.

33 See id. at 101, 214 n.28.
34 See Paul Horwitz, Weekend Reading I-Religion and American Politics: Three Views
of the Cathedral, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/paul-horwitz/page/4/ (Oct. 3,
2008, 15:30 EST).
35 Of course, there are many intermediate and mixed portions, but these categories are

adequate for the preliminary analysis that follows.
36 SmFFRIN, supra note 1, at 2.
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Shiffrin at one point suggests that all fundamental premises about
existence are really matters of choice, 37 but I don't think we could expect
even enlightened religious skeptics to accept the view that reason fails to
support their outlook.
To put in context my following effort to briefly cover incredibly
complex questions within a modest paragraph, I agree with Shiffrin that
rational thought, scientific or nonscientific, cannot settle fundamental
questions of human existence, and I myself maintain, with some uncertainty, fundamental Christian assumptions as I understand them. But
when it comes to specific items of doctrine, such as whether Mary conceived Jesus without sexual intercourse, I think reason plays a significant
role-although an omnipotent God could have achieved a virgin birth, I
don't understand why God would have chosen that course, which seems
in some tension with the basic idea of Jesus being fully human. As for
the yet more fundamental question of whether an omnipotent, loving
God exists, the extreme suffering of some creatures who seem totally
innocent of any wrongdoing is a genuine obstacle. In sum, I think our
religious convictions are based on some mix of upbringing, what reason
tells us, intuitions that we are incapable of reducing to reason, and psychological propensities-factors that themselves are interrelated in ways
that exceed full description. As to our "choice" of convictions, many
persons who deeply want to believe in a loving God and life after death
find themselves incapable of doing so.
Although many secular liberals might be persuaded that reason does
not conclusively establish that typical religious views are completely
false, they are not likely to concede that their views enjoy no more support in reason than those of the devoutly religious. This creates a limit to
what religious liberals can expect, and hope for, in the way of persuading
secular liberals.
Shiffrin suggests that those secular liberals might well refrain from
expressing their highly negative views about religion in the public sphere
because those expressions undercut the cause of political liberalism by
influencing people to think it is antireligious. 38 A secular liberal largely
persuaded by Shiffrin's analysis might put the problem he or she faces
like this: "I want to express my view of religion so people will, over
time, become less religious. I now see that this aim of needed public
education is in conflict with the near-term aim of protecting political liberalism. If I keep quiet, this may be helpful to political liberals with less
controversial views, but the cost will be acquiescence in people continuing to delude themselves with religious superstition. Moreover, insofar
as proper constitutional interpretation depends partly on cultural tradiSee id. at 130-31.
38 See id. at 7.
37
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tions over time, a further cost might be to delay development of a thoroughly secular society in which modest religious endorsements should be
viewed as unconstitutional."
Relatedly, since these secular liberals believe all religious premises
and institutions are themselves fundamentally unsound, we could not expect them to think the religious liberals have answers to religious conservatives that are genuinely sounder than skeptical secular answers. We
might hope for a degree of respect for religious liberals and of political
cooperation, but alliances along these lines would be bound to be uneasy.
The last part of Shiffrin's book is both illuminating and provocative.
It provides a powerful basis to reject public reasons theory for the discourse of our liberal democracy. In raising the fascinating question of
just how far secular liberals might defer to religious liberals, it opens up
a range of possibilities that deserve continued exploration.

